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Abstract
We present a formulation of deep learning that aims at producing a large margin
classifier. The notion of margin, minimum distance to a decision boundary, has
served as the foundation of several theoretically profound and empirically suc-
cessful results for both classification and regression tasks. However, most large
margin algorithms are applicable only to shallow models with a preset feature
representation; and conventional margin methods for neural networks only enforce
margin at the output layer. Such methods are therefore not well suited for deep
networks. In this work, we propose a novel loss function to impose a margin on
any chosen set of layers of a deep network (including input and hidden layers).
Our formulation allows choosing any lp norm (p ≥ 1) on the metric measuring
the margin. We demonstrate that the decision boundary obtained by our loss has
nice properties compared to standard classification loss functions. Specifically, we
show improved empirical results on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets
on multiple tasks: generalization from small training sets, corrupted labels, and
robustness against adversarial perturbations. The resulting loss is general and
complementary to existing data augmentation (such as random/adversarial input
transform) and regularization techniques (such as weight decay, dropout, and batch
norm). 2
1 Introduction
The large margin principle has played a key role in the course of machine learning history, producing
remarkable theoretical and empirical results for classification (Vapnik, 1995) and regression problems
(Drucker et al., 1997). However, exact large margin algorithms are only suitable for shallow models.
In fact, for deep models, computation of the margin itself becomes intractable. This is in contrast
to classic setups such as kernel SVMs, where the margin has an analytical form (the l2 norm of the
parameters). Desirable benefits of large margin classifiers include better generalization properties
and robustness to input perturbations (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995; Bousquet & Elisseeff, 2002).
To overcome the limitations of classical margin approaches, we design a novel loss function based
on a first-order approximation of the margin. This loss function is applicable to any network
architecture (e.g., arbitrary depth, activation function, use of convolutions, residual networks), and
complements existing general-purpose regularization techniques such as weight-decay, dropout and
batch normalization.
∗Work done as member of the Google AI Residency program https://ai.google/research/join-us/
ai-residency/
2Code for the large margin loss function is released at https://github.com/google-research/
google-research/tree/master/large_margin
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We illustrate the basic idea of a large margin classifier within a toy setup in Figure 1. For demonstration
purposes, consider a binary classification task and assume there is a model that can perfectly separate
the data. Suppose the models is parameterized by vector w, and the model g(x;w) maps the input
vector x to a real number, as shown in Figure 1(a); where the yellow region corresponds to positive
values of g(x;w) and the blue region to negative values; the red and blue dots represent training
points from the two classes. Such g is sometimes called a discriminant function. For a fixed w,
g(x;w) partitions the input space into two sets of regions, depending on whether g(x;w) is positive
or negative at those points. We refer to the boundary of these sets as the decision boundary, which
can be characterized by {x | g(x;w) = 0} when g is a continuous function. For a fixed w, consider
the distance of each training point to the decision boundary. We call the smallest non-negative such
distance the margin. A large margin classifier seeks model parameters w that attain the largest
margin. Figure 1(b) shows the decision boundaries attained by our new loss (right), and another
solution attained by the standard cross-entropy loss (left). The yellow squares show regions where
the large margin solution better captures the correct data distribution.
(a) (b) cross entropy: test accuracy 98% large margin: test accuracy 99%
Figure 1: Illustration of large margin. (a) The distance of each training point to the decision
boundary, with the shortest one being marked as γ. While the closest point to the decision boundary
does not need to be unique, the value of shortest distance (i.e. γ itself) is unique. (b) Toy example
illustrating a good and a bad decision boundary obtained by optimizing a 4-layer deep network with
cross-entropy loss (left), and with our proposed large margin loss (right). The two losses were trained
for 10000 steps on data shown in bold dots (train accuracy is 100% for both losses). Accuracy on test
data (light dots) is reported at the top of each figure. Note how the decision boundary is better shaped
in the region outlined by the yellow squares. This figure is best seen in PDF.
Margin may be defined based on the values of g (i.e. the output space) or on the input space. Despite
similar naming, the two are very different. Margin based on output space values is the conventional
definition. In fact, output margin can be computed exactly even for deep networks (Sun et al., 2015).
In contrast, the margin in the input space is computationally intractable for deep models. Despite
that, the input margin is often of more practical interest. For example, a large margin in the input
space implies immunity to input perturbations. Specifically, if a classifier attains margin of γ, i.e.
the decision boundary is at least γ away from all the training points, then any perturbation of the
input that is smaller than γ will not be able to flip the predicted label. More formally, a model with a
margin of γ is robust to perturbations x+ δ where sign(g(x)) = sign(g(x+ δ)), when ‖δ‖< γ. It
has been shown that standard deep learning methods lack such robustness (Szegedy et al., 2013).
In this work, our main contribution is to derive a new loss for obtaining a large margin classifier
for deep networks, where the margin can be based on any lp-norm (p ≥ 1), and the margin may be
defined on any chosen set of layers of a network. We empirically evaluate our loss function on deep
networks across different applications, datasets and model architectures. Specifically, we study the
performance of these models on tasks of adversarial learning, generalization from limited training
data, and learning from data with noisy labels. We show that the proposed loss function consistently
outperforms baseline models trained with conventional losses, e.g. for adversarial perturbation, we
outperform common baselines by up to 21% on MNIST, 14% on CIFAR-10 and 11% on Imagenet.
2 Related Work
Prior work (Liu et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2015; Sokolic et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2017) has explored
the benefits of encouraging large margin in the context of deep networks. Sun et al. (2015) state that
2
cross-entropy loss does not have margin-maximization properties, and add terms to the cross-entropy
loss to encourage large margin solutions. However, these terms encourage margins only at the
output layer of a deep neural network. Other recent work (Soudry et al., 2017), proved that one
can attain max-margin solution by using cross-entropy loss with stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
optimization. Yet this was only demonstrated for linear architecture, making it less useful for deep,
nonlinear networks. Sokolic et al. (2016) introduced a regularizer based on the Jacobian of the loss
function with respect to network layers, and demonstrated that their regularizer can lead to larger
margin solutions. This formulation only offers L2 distance metrics and therefore may not be robust
to deviation of data based on other metrics (e.g., adversarial perturbations). In contrast, our work
formulates a loss function that directly maximizes the margin at any layer, including input, hidden
and output layers. Our formulation is general to margin definitions in different distance metrics (e.g.
l1, l2, and l∞ norms). We provide empirical evidence of superior performance in generalization
tasks with limited data and noisy labels, as well as robustness to adversarial perturbations. Finally,
Hein & Andriushchenko (2017) propose a linearization similar to ours, but use a very different loss
function for optimization. Their setup and optimization are specific to the adversarial robustness
scenario, whereas we also consider generalization and noisy labels; their resulting loss function
is computationally expensive and possibly difficult to scale to large problems such as Imagenet.
Matyasko & Chau (2017) also derive a similar linearization and apply it to adversarial robustness
with promising results on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
In real applications, training data is often not as copious as we would like, and collected data might
have noisy labels. Generalization has been extensively studied as part of the semi-supervised and
few-shot learning literature, e.g. (Vinyals et al., 2016; Rasmus et al., 2015). Specific techniques
to handle noisy labels for deep networks have also been developed (Sukhbaatar et al., 2014; Reed
et al., 2014). Our margin loss provides generalization benefits and robustness to noisy labels and is
complementary to these works. Deep networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks (Szegedy et al.,
2013) and a number of attacks (Papernot et al., 2017; Sharif et al., 2016; Hosseini et al., 2017), and
defenses (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017; Athalye & Sutskever, 2017) have
been developed. A natural benefit of large margins is robustness to adversarial attacks, as we show
empirically in Sec. 4.
3 Large Margin Deep Networks
Consider a classification problem with n classes. Suppose we use a function fi : X → R, for
i = 1, . . . , n that generates a prediction score for classifying the input vector x ∈ X to class i. The
predicted label is decided by the class with maximal score, i.e. i∗ = argmaxi fi(x).
Define the decision boundary for each class pair {i, j} as:
D{i,j} , {x | fi(x) = fj(x)} (1)
Under this definition, the distance of a point x to the decision boundary D{i,j} is defined as the
smallest displacement of the point that results in a score tie:
df,x,{i,j} , min
δ
‖δ‖p s.t. fi(x+ δ) = fj(x+ δ) (2)
Here ‖.‖p is any lp norm (p ≥ 1). Using this distance, we can develop a large margin loss. We start
with a training set consisting of pairs (xk, yk), where the label yk ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We penalize the
displacement of each xk to satisfy the margin constraint for separating class yk from class i (i 6= yk).
This implies using the following loss function:
max{0, γ + df,xk,{i,yk} sign (fi(xk)− fyk(xk))} , (3)
where the sign(.) adjusts the polarity of the distance. The intuition is that, if xk is already correctly
classified, then we only want to ensure it has distance γ from the decision boundary, and penalize
proportional to the distance d it falls short (so the penalty is max{0, γ − d}). However, if it is
misclassified, we also want to penalize the point for not being correctly classified. Hence, the penalty
includes the distance xk needs to travel to reach the decision boundary as well as another γ distance
to travel on the correct side of decision boundary to attain γ margin. Therefore, the penalty becomes
max{0, γ + d}. In a multiclass setting, we aggregate individual losses arising from each i 6= yk by
some aggregation operator A :
Ai6=yk max{0, γ + df,xk,{i,yk} sign (fi(xk)− fyk(xk))} (4)
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In this paper we use two aggregation operators, namely the max operator max and the sum operator∑
. In order to learn fi’s, we assume they are parameterized by a vectorw and should use the notation
fi(x;w); for brevity we keep using the notation fi(x). The goal is to minimize the loss w.r.t. w:
w∗ , argmin
w
∑
k
Ai6=yk max{0, γ + df,xk,{i,yk} sign (fi(xk)− fyk (xk))} (5)
The above formulation depends on d, whose exact computation from (2) is intractable when fi’s are
nonlinear. Instead, we present an approximation to d by linearizing fi w.r.t. δ around δ = 0.
d˜f,x,{i,j} , min
δ
‖δ‖p s.t. fi(x) + 〈δ,∇xfi(x)〉 = fj(x) + 〈δ,∇xfj(x)〉 (6)
This problem now has the following closed form solution (see supplementary for proof):
d˜f,x,{i,j} =
|fi(x)− fj(x)|
‖∇xfi(x)−∇xfj(x)‖q , (7)
where ‖.‖q is the dual-norm of ‖.‖p. lq is the dual norm of lp when it satisfies q , pp−1 (Boyd &
Vandenberghe, 2004). For example if distances are measured w.r.t. l1, l2, or l∞ norm, the norm in (7)
will respectively be l∞, l2, or l1 norm. Using the linear approximation, the loss function becomes:
wˆ , argmin
w
∑
k
Ai6=yk max{0, γ +
|fi(xk)− fyk(xk)|
‖∇xfi(xk)−∇xfyk(xk)‖q
sign (fi(xk)− fyk(xk))} (8)
This further simplifies to the following problem:
wˆ , argmin
w
∑
k
Ai 6=yk max{0, γ +
fi(xk)− fyk(xk)
‖∇xfi(xk)−∇xfyk(xk)‖q
} (9)
In (Huang et al., 2015), (7) has been derived (independently of us) to facilitate adversarial training
with different norms. In contrast, we develop a novel margin-based loss function that uses this
distance metric at multiple hidden layers, and show benefits for a wide range of problems. In the
supplementary material, we show that (7) coincides with an SVM for the special case of a linear
classifier.
3.1 Margin for Hidden Layers
The classic notion of margin is defined based on the distance of input samples from the decision
boundary; in shallow models such as SVM, input/output association is the only way to define a
margin. In deep networks, however, the output is shaped from input by going through a number
of transformations (layers). In fact, the activations at each intermediate layer could be interpreted
as some intermediate representation of the data for the following part of the network. Thus, we
can define the margin based on any intermediate representation and the ultimate decision boundary.
We leverage this structure to enforce that the entire representation maintain a large margin with the
decision boundary. The idea then, is to simply replace the input x in the margin formulation (9)
with the intermediate representation of x. More precisely, let h` denote the output of the `’th layer
(h0 = x) and γ` be the margin enforced for its corresponding representation. Then the margin loss
(9) can be adapted as below to incorporate intermediate margins (where the  in the denominator is
used to prevent numerical problems, and is set to a small value such as 10−6 in practice):
wˆ , argmin
w
∑
`,k
Ai 6=yk max{0, γ` +
fi(xk)− fyk(xk)
+ ‖∇h`fi(xk)−∇h`fyk(xk)‖q
} (10)
4 Experiments
Here we provide empirical results using formulation (10) on a number of tasks and datasets. We
consider the following datasets and models: a deep convolutional network for MNIST (LeCun et al.,
1998), a deep residual convolutional network for CIFAR-10 (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) and an
Imagenet model with the Inception v3 architecture (Szegedy et al., 2016). Details of the architectures
and hyperparameter settings are provided in the supplementary material. Our code was written in
Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2016). The tasks we consider are: training with noisy labels, training with
limited data, and defense against adversarial perturbations. In all these cases, we expect that the
presence of a large margin provides robustness and improves test accuracies. As shown below, this is
indeed the case across all datasets and scenarios considered.
4
4.1 Optimization of Parameters
Our loss function (10) differs from the cross-entropy loss due to the presence of gradients in the
loss itself. We compute these gradients for each class i 6= yk (yk is the true label corresponding to
sample xk). To reduce computational cost, we choose a subset of the total number of classes. We
pick these classes by choosing i 6= yk that have the highest value from the forward propagation step.
For MNIST and CIFAR-10, we used all 9 (other) classes. For Imagenet we used only 1 class i 6= yk
(increasing k increased computational cost without helping performance). The backpropagation step
for parameter updates requires the computation of second-order mixed gradients. To further reduce
computation cost to a manageable level, we use a first-order Taylor approximation to the gradient
with respect to the weights. This approximation simply corresponds to treating the denominator
(‖∇h`fi(xk)−∇h`fyk(xk)‖q) in (10) as a constant with respect tow for backpropagation. The value
of ‖∇h`fi(xk) −∇h`fyk(xk)‖q is recomputed at every forward propagation step. We compared
performance with and without this approximation for MNIST and found minimal difference in
accuracy, but significantly higher GPU memory requirement due to the computation of second-order
mixed derivatives without the approximation (a derivative with respect to activations, followed by
another with respect to weights). Using these optimizations, we found, for example, that training
is around 20% to 60% more expensive in wall-clock time for the margin model compared to cross-
entropy, measured on the same NVIDIA p100 GPU (but note that there is no additional cost at
inference time). Finally, to improve stability when the denominator is small, we found it beneficial to
clip the loss at some threshold. We use standard optimizers such as RMSProp (Tieleman & Hinton,
2012).
4.2 MNIST
We train a 4 hidden-layer model with 2 convolutional layers and 2 fully connected layers, with
rectified linear unit (ReLu) activation functions, and a softmax output layer. The first baseline
model uses a cross-entropy loss function, trained with stochastic gradient descent optimization with
momentum and learning rate decay. A natural question is whether having a large margin loss defined
at the network output such as the standard hinge loss could be sufficient to give good performance.
Therefore, we trained a second baseline model using a hinge loss combined with a small weight of
cross-entropy.
The large margin model has the same architecture as the baseline, but we use our new loss function
in formulation (10). We considered margin models using an l∞, l1 or l2 norm on the distances,
respectively. For each norm, we train a model with margin either only on the input layer, or on all
hidden layers and the output layer. Thus there are 6 margin models in all. For models with margin
at all layers, the hyperparameter γl is set to the same value for each layer (to reduce the number of
hyperparameters). Furthermore, we observe that using a weighted sum of margin and cross-entropy
facilitates training and speeds up convergence 3. We tested all models with both stochastic gradient
descent with momentum, and RMSProp (Hinton et al.) optimizers and chose the one that worked
best on the validation set. In case of cross-entropy and hinge loss we used momentum, in case of
margin models for MNIST, we used RMSProp with no momentum.
For all our models, we perform a hyperparameter search including with and without dropout, with
and without weight decay and different values of γl for the margin model (same value for all layers
where margin is applied). We hold out 5, 000 samples of the training set as a validation set, and the
remaining 55, 000 samples are used for training. The full evaluation set of 10, 000 samples is used
for reporting all accuracies. Under this protocol, the cross-entropy and margin models trained on
the 55, 000 sample training set achieves a test accuracy of 99.4% and the hinge loss model achieve
99.2%.
4.2.1 Noisy Labels
In this experiment, we choose, for each training sample, whether to flip its label with some other
label chosen at random. E.g. an instance of “1” may be labeled as digit “6”. The percentage of such
flipped labels varies from 0% to 80% in increments of 20%. Once a label is flipped, that label is fixed
throughout training. Fig. 2(left) shows the performance of the best performing 4 (all layer margin
3We emphasize that the performance achieved with this combination cannot be obtained by cross-entropy
alone, as shown in the performance plots.
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and cross-entropy) of the 8 algorithms, with test accuracy plotted against noise level. It is seen that
the margin l1 and l2 models perform better than cross-entropy across the entire range of noise levels,
while the margin l∞ model is slightly worse than cross-entropy. In particular, the margin l2 model
achieves a evaluation accuracy of 96.4% at 80% label noise, compared to 93.9% for cross-entropy.
The input only margin models were outperformed by the all layer margin models and are not shown
in Fig. 2. We find that this holds true across all our tests. The performance of all 8 methods is shown
in the supplementary material.
Figure 2: Performance of MNIST models on: (left) noisy label tasks and (right) generalization tasks.
4.2.2 Generalization
In this experiment we consider models trained with significantly lower amounts of training data. This
is a problem of practical importance, and we expect that a large margin model should have better
generalization abilities. Specifically, we randomly remove some fraction of the training set, going
down from 100% of training samples to only 0.125%, which is 68 samples. In Fig. 2(right), the
performance of cross-entropy, hinge and margin (all layers) is shown. The test accuracy is plotted
against the fraction of data used for training. We also show the generalization results of a Bayesian
active learning approach presented in (Gal et al., 2017). The all-layer margin models outperform both
cross-entropy and (Gal et al., 2017) over the entire range of testing, and the amount by which the
margin models outperform increases as the dataset size decreases. The all-layer l∞-margin model
outperforms cross-entropy by around 3.7% in the smallest training set of 68 samples. We use the
same randomly drawn training set for all models.
4.2.3 Adversarial Perturbation
Beginning with (Goodfellow et al., 2014), a number of papers (Papernot et al., 2016; Kurakin et al.,
2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) have examined the presence of adversarial examples that can
“fool” deep networks. These papers show that there exist small perturbations to images that can
cause a deep network to misclassify the resulting perturbed examples. We use the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) and the iterative version (IFGSM) of perturbation introduced in (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Kurakin et al., 2016) to generate adversarial examples4. Details of FGSM and IFGSM are
given in the supplementary.
For each method, we generate a set of perturbed adversarial examples using one network, and then
measure the accuracy of the same (white-box) or another (black-box) network on these examples.
Fig. 3 (left, middle) shows the performance of the 8 models for IFGSM attacks (which are stronger
than FGSM). FGSM performance is given in the supplementary. We plot test accuracy against
different values of  used to generate the adversarial examples. In both FGSM and IFGSM scenarios,
all margin models significantly outperform cross-entropy, with the all-layer margin models outperform
the input-only margin, showing the benefit of margin at hidden layers. This is not surprising as the
adversarial attacks are specifically defined in input space. Furthermore, since FGSM/IFGSM are
defined in the l∞ norm, we see that the l∞ margin model performs the best among the three norms.
In the supplementary, we also show the white-box performance of the method from (Madry et al.,
2017) 5, which is an algorithm specifically designed for adversarial defenses against FGSM attacks.
4There are also other methods of generating adversarial perturbations, not considered here.
5We used  values provided by the authors.
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One of the margin models outperforms this method, and another is very competitive. For black box,
the attacker is a cross-entropy model. It is seen that the margin models are robust against black-box
attacks, significantly outperforming cross-entropy. For example at  = 0.1, cross-entropy is at 67%
accuracy, while the best margin model is at 90%.
Kurakin et al. (2016) suggested adversarial training as a defense against adversarial attacks. This
approach augments training data with adversarial examples. However, they showed that adding
FGSM examples in this manner, often do not confer robustness to IFGSM attacks, and is also
computationally costly. Our margin models provide a mechanism for robustness that is independent
of the type of attack. Further, our method is complementary and can still be used with adversarial
training. To demonstrate this, Fig. 3 (right) shows the improved performance of the l∞ model
compared to the cross-entropy model for black-box attacks from a cross-entropy model, when the
models are adversarially trained. While the gap between cross-entropy and margin models is reduced
in this scenario, we continue to see greater performance from the margin model at higher values
of . Importantly, we saw no benefit for the generalization or noisy label tasks from adversarial
training - thus showing that this type of data augmentation provides very specific robustness. In the
supplementary, we also show the performance against input corrupted with varying levels of Gaussian
noise, showing the benefit of margin for this type of perturbation as well.
Figure 3: Robustness of MNIST models to adversarial attacks: (Left) White-box IFGSM; (Middle)
Black-box IFGSM; (Right) Black-box performance of adversarially trained models.
4.3 CIFAR-10
Next, we test our models for the same tasks on CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009).
We use the ResNet model proposed in Zagoruyko & Komodakis (2016), consisting of an input
convolutional layer, 3 blocks of residual convolutional layers where each block containing 9 layers,
for a total of 58 convolutional layers. Similar to MNIST, we set aside 10% of the training data for
validation, leaving a total of 45, 000 training samples, and 5, 000 validation samples. We train margin
models with multiple layers of margin, choosing 5 evenly spaced layers (input layer, output layer and
3 other convolutional layers in the middle) across the network. We perform a hyper-parameter search
across margin values. We also train with data augmentation (random image transformations such
as cropping and contrast/hue changes). Hyperparameter details are provided in the supplementary
material. With these settings, we achieve a baseline accuracy of around 90% for the following 5
models: cross-entropy, hinge, margin l∞, l1 and l26
4.3.1 Noisy Labels
Fig. 4 (left) shows the performance of the 5 models under the same noisy label regime, with fractions
of noise ranging from 0% to 80%. The margin l∞ and l2 models consistently outperforms cross-
entropy by 4% to 10% across the range of noise levels.
4.3.2 Generalization
Fig. 4(right) shows the performance of the 5 CIFAR-10 models on the generalization task. We
consistently see superior performance of the l1 and l∞ margin models w.r.t. cross-entropy, especially
6With a better CIFAR network WRN-40-10 from Zagoruyko & Komodakis (2016), we were able to achieve
95% accuracy on full data.
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Figure 4: Performance of CIFAR-10 models on noisy data (left) and limited data (right).
Figure 5: Performance of CIFAR-10 models on IFGSM adversarial examples.
as the amount of data is reduced. For example at 5% and 1% of the total data, the l1 margin model
outperforms the cross-entropy model by 2.5%.
4.3.3 Adversarial Perturbations
Fig. 5 shows the performance of cross-entropy and margin models for IFGSM attacks, for both
white-box and black box scenarios. The l1 and l∞ margin models perform well for both sets of
attacks, giving a clear boost over cross-entropy. For  = 0.1, the l1 model achieves an improvement
over cross-entropy of about 14% when defending against a cross-entropy attack. Another approach
for robustness is in (Cisse et al., 2017), where the Lipschitz constant of network layers is kept small,
thereby directly insulating the network from small perturbations. Our models trained with margin
significantly outperform their reported results in Table 1 for CIFAR-10. For an SNR of 33 (as
computed in their paper), we achieve 82% accuracy compared to 69.1% by them (for non-adversarial
training), a 18.7 % relative improvement.
4.4 Imagenet
We tested our l1 margin model against cross-entropy for a full-scale Imagenet model based on
the Inception architecture (Szegedy et al., 2016), with data augmentation. Our margin model and
cross-entropy achieved a top-1 validation precision of 78% respectively, close to the 78.8% reported
in (Szegedy et al., 2016). We test the Imagenet models for white-box FGSM and IFGSM attacks, as
well as for black-box attacks defending against cross-entropy model attacks. Results are shown in
Fig. 6. We see that the margin model consistently outperforms cross-entropy for black and white box
FGSM and IFGSM attacks. For example at  = 0.1, we see that cross-entropy achieves a white-box
FGSM accuracy of 33%, whereas margin achieves 44% white-box accuracy and 59% black-box
accuracy. Note that our FGSM accuracy numbers on the cross-entropy model are quite close to that
achieved in (Kurakin et al., 2016) (Table 2, top row); also note that we use a wider range of  in our
experiments.
8
Figure 6: Imagenet white-box/black-box performance on adversarial examples.
5 Discussion
We have presented a new loss function inspired by the theory of large margin that is amenable to
deep network training. This new loss is flexible and can establish a large margin that can be defined
on input, hidden or output layers, and using l∞, l1, and l2 distance definitions. Models trained with
this loss perform well in a number of practical scenarios compared to baselines on standard datasets.
The formulation is independent of network architecture and input domain and is complementary to
other regularization techniques such as weight decay and dropout. Our method is computationally
practical: for Imagenet, our training was about 1.6 times more expensive than cross-entropy (per
step). Finally, our empirical results show the benefit of margin at the hidden layers of a network.
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A Derivation of Equation (7) in paper
Consider the following optimization problem,
d , min
δ
‖δ‖p s.t. aT δ = b (11)
We show that d has the form d = |b|‖a‖∗ , where ‖.‖∗ is the dual-norm of ‖.‖p. For a given norm ‖.‖p,
the length of any vector u w.r.t. to the dual norm is defined as ‖u‖∗, max‖v‖p≤1 uTv. Since uTv
is linear, the maximizer is attained at the boundary of the feasible set, i.e. ‖v‖p= 1. Therefore, it
follows that:
‖u‖∗= max‖v‖p=1u
Tv = max
v
uT
v
‖v‖p = maxv |u
T v
‖v‖p | , (12)
In particular for u = a and v = δ:
‖a‖∗= max
δ
|aT δ‖δ‖p | (13)
So far we have just used properties of the dual norm. In order to prove our result, we start from
the trivial identity (assuming ‖δ‖p 6= 0 which is guaranteed when b 6= 0): aT δ = ‖δ‖p(aTδ‖δ‖p ).
Consequently, |aT δ|= ‖δ‖p |aTδ‖δ‖p |. Applying the constraint a
T δ = b, we obtain |b|= ‖δ‖p |aTδ‖δ‖p |.
Thus, we can write,
‖δ‖p= |b||aTδ‖δ‖p |
=⇒ min
δ
‖δ‖p= min
δ
|b|
|aTδ‖δ‖p |
. (14)
We thus continue as below (using (13) in the last step):
min
δ
‖δ‖p= min
δ
|b|
|aTδ‖δ‖p |
=
|b|
maxδ|aTδ‖δ‖p |
=
|b|
‖a‖∗ (15)
It is well known from Hölder’s inequality that ‖.‖∗= ‖.‖q , where q = pp−1 .
B SVM as a Special Case
In the special case of a linear classifier, our large margin formulation coincides with an SVM. Consider
a binary classification task, so that fi(x) , wTi x+ bi, for i = 1, 2. Let g(x) , f1(x)− f2(x) =
wTx+ b where w , w1 −w2, b , b1 − b2. Recall from Eq. (7) (in the paper) that the distance to
the decision boundary in our formulation is defined as:
d˜f,x,{i,j} =
|g(x)|
‖∇xg(x)‖2 =
|wTx+ b|
‖w‖2 , (16)
In this (linear) case, there is a scaling redundancy; if the model parameter (w, b) yields distance d˜, so
does (cw, cb) for any c > 0. For SVMs, we make the problem well-posed by assuming |wTx+b|≥ 1
(the subset of training points that attains the equality are called support vectors). Thus, denoting the
evaluation of d˜ at x = xk by d˜k, the inequality constraint implies that d˜k ≥ 1‖w‖2 for any training
point xk. The margin is defined as the smallest such distance γ , mink d˜k = 1‖w‖2 . Obviously,
maximizing γ is equivalent to minimizing ‖w‖2; the well-known result for SVMs.
C MNIST - Additional Results
D FGSM/IFGSM Adversarial Example Generation
Given an input image x, a loss function L(x), the perturbed FGSM image xˆ is generated as xˆ ,
x +  sign(∇xL(x)). For IFGSM, this process is slightly modified as xˆk , Clipx,(xˆk−1 +
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Figure 7: Performance of MNIST models on noisy label tasks. In this plot and all others, “Xent"
refers to cross-entropy.
Figure 8: Performance of MNIST models on generalization tasks. Gal etal. refers to the method of
(Gal et al., 2017).
α sign(∇xL(xˆk)), xˆ0 = x, where Clipx,(y) clips the values of each pixel i of y to the range
(xi− ,xi+ ). This process is repeated for a number of iterations k ≥ /α. The value of  is usually
set to a small number such as 0.1 to generate imperceptible perturbations which can nevertheless
cause the accuracy of a network to be significantly degraded.
E CIFAR-10 - Additional Results
Figure 11 shows the performance of the CIFAR-10 models against FGSM black-box and white-box
attacks.
F MNIST Model Architecture and Hyperparameter Details
We use a 4 hidden layer network. The first two hidden layers are convolutional, with filter sizes of
5 × 5 and 32 and 64 units. The hidden layers are of size 512 each. We use a learning rate of 0.01.
Dropout is set to either 0 or 0.2 (hyperparameter sweep for each run), weight decay to 0 or 0.005,
and γl to 200 or 1000 (for margin only). The same value of γl is used at all layers where margin
is applied for ease of hyperparameter tuning. The aggregation operator (see (4) in the paper) is set
to max. For margin training, we add cross-entropy loss with a small weight of 1.0. For example,
as noise levels increase, we find that dropout hurts performance. The best performing validation
accuracy among the parameter sweeps is used for reporting final test accuracy. We run for 50000
steps of training with mini-batch size of 128. We use either SGD with momentum or RMSProp. We
fix  at 10−6 for all experiments (see Equation 16 in the paper) - this applies to all datasets.
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Figure 9: Performance of MNIST models on white-box and black-box FGSM attacks. For the
black-box, attacker is a cross-entropy trained model (best seen in PDF).
Figure 10: Performance of selected MNIST models on input Gaussian Noise with varying standard
deviations.
G CIFAR-10 Model Architecture and Hyperparameter Details
We use the depth 58, k=10 architecture from (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016). This consists of
a first convolutional layer with filters of size 3 × 3 and 16 units; followed by 3 sets of residual
units (9 residual units each). No dropout is used. Learning rate is set to 0.001 for margin and
0.01 for cross-entropy and hinge. with decay of 0.9 every 2000 or 20000 steps (we choose from a
hyperparameter sweep). γl is set to either 5000, 10000 or 20000 (as for MNIST, the same value of γl
is used at all layers where margin is applied). The aggregation operator for margin is set to
∑
. We
use either SGD with momentum or RMSProp. For margin training, we add cross-entropy loss with a
small weight of 1.0.
H Imagenet Model Architecture and Hyperparameter Details
We follow the architecture in (Szegedy et al., 2016). We always use RMSProp for optimization. For
margin training, we add cross-entropy loss with a small weight of 0.1 and an additional auxiliary loss
(as suggested in the paper) in the middle of the network.
I Evolution of distance metric
Below we show plots of our distance approximation (see (7)) averaged over each mini-batch for 50000
steps of training CIFAR-10 model with 100% of the data. This is a screengrab from a Tensorflow
run (Tensorboard). The orange curve represents training distance, red curve is validation and blur
curve is test. We show plots for different layers, for both cross-entropy and margin. It is seen that for
each layer, (input, layer 7 and output), the margin achieves a higher mean distance to boundary than
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Figure 11: Performance of CIFAR-10 models on FGSM adversarial examples (best seen in PDF).
cross-entropy (for input, margin achieves mean distance about 100 for test set, whereas cross-entropy
achieves about 70.). Note that for cross-entropy we are only measuring this distance.
Figure 12: Cross-entropy (top) Margin (bottom) mean distance to boundary for input layer of
CIFAR-10.
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Figure 13: Cross-entropy (top) Margin (bottom) mean distance to boundary for hidden layer 7 of
CIFAR-10.
Figure 14: Cross-entropy (top) Margin (bottom) mean distance to boundary for output layer of
CIFAR-10.
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